American Indian Law Review
Volume 36

Number 2

1-1-2012

United States v. Jicarilla Apache Nation: Why the Supreme Court's
Refusal to Apply the Fiduciary Exception to Attorney-Client
Privilege Stands to Diminish the Federal-Tribal Trust Relationship
Daniel W. Hart

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/ailr
Part of the Indigenous, Indian, and Aboriginal Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Daniel W. Hart, United States v. Jicarilla Apache Nation: Why the Supreme Court's Refusal to Apply the
Fiduciary Exception to Attorney-Client Privilege Stands to Diminish the Federal-Tribal Trust Relationship,
36 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 527 (2012),
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/ailr/vol36/iss2/8

This Note is brought to you for free and open access by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons. It
has been accepted for inclusion in American Indian Law Review by an authorized editor of University of Oklahoma
College of Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact Law-LibraryDigitalCommons@ou.edu.

UNITED STATES V. JICARILLA APACHE NATION: WHY
THE SUPREME COURT'S REFUSAL TO APPLY THE
FIDUCIARY EXCEPTION TO ATTORNEY-CLIENT
PRIVILEGE STANDS TO DIMINISH THE FEDERAL-TRIBAL
TRUST RELATIONSHIP
Daniel W. Hart*
Introduction
The United States holds an enormous amount of land and natural
resources in trust for Native Americans, with the Department of Interior
managing almost $2.9 billion in tribal trust funds.' Sadly, the United States
has not always managed those funds with the utmost transparency and
efficiency.2 As a result, tribes have challenged the United States through
trust mismanagement suits, seeking redress for breach of its fiduciary duty
as trustee. The source of contention in these suits, including one upon
which the Supreme Court has waffled, is the extent of the fiduciary duty
that the United States owes to tribes.
In United States v. JicarillaApache Nation,3 the Supreme Court held that
the United States could use the attorney-client privilege to prevent tribes
from discovering documents relating to legal advice sought by the
Department of Interior and other agencies concerning management of tribal
funds. This holding stemmed from the Supreme Court's flawed reasoning
that a sufficient, true tribal trust relationship, at least in this context, does
not exist, meaning that the United States is under no fiduciary obligation to
disclose the requested documents.
This article examines the application of the fiduciary exception to the
attorney-client privilege in tribal trust mismanagement cases, with
particular emphasis on the fiduciary duties of the United States as trustee of
tribal funds, to assert that: (1) there is a true trust relationship between the
United States and tribes; (2) that supports a duty to disclose information
concerning management of Indian trusts; and (3) is nevertheless capable of
* Second-year student, University of Oklahoma College of Law.
1. COHEN'S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAw 407 (Nell Jessup Newton et al. eds.,
LexisNexis 2005) [hereinafter COHEN].
2. See Cobell v. Norton, 240 F.3d 1081, 1090 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (citing MISPLACED
TRUST: THE BUREAU OF INDIAN AFFAIRS' MISMANAGEMENT OF THE INDIAN TRUST FUND, H.R.

REP. No. 102-499 (1992)).
3. United States v. Jicarilla Apache Nation (JicarillaII), 131 S. Ct. 2313 (2011).

4. Id. at 2318.
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accommodating a workable, narrow application of the fiduciary exception
to attorney-client privilege given acknowledged U.S. interests and its
position as sovereign. To further these assertions, Part I of this article
provides a brief overview of general trust doctrine and tribal trust doctrine,
followed by an overview of attorney-client privilege and the fiduciary
exception in both the private and tribal trust context. Part II summarizes the
Court of Federal Claim's opinion, the Federal Court of Appeals' opinion,
and the Supreme Court's opinion, which Part III then explores to suggest
that the United States, as trustee of Indian assets, should be held to the
standards of a typical trustee acting in a fiduciary capacity. The conclusion
emphasizes the spiraling effect that this seemingly innocuous decision has
on the trust relationship, both legally and metaphorically, between the
United States and Native American tribes.
I. Background
A. General Trust Doctrine
One of the Supreme Court's main contentions in JicarillaIII is that the
government is not like a private trustee, and therefore not subject to the
fiduciary duties of a typical trustee under the common law of trusts.
As the Restatement defines it, a trust is essentially a fiduciary
relationship between the trustee and beneficiaries.' According to the
Restatement Third of Trusts and the Uniform Trust Code (UTC), the
general rule is that a trustee, investing the trust corpus for the benefit of
beneficiaries, has an obligation to act with reasonable skill and prudence.
The precise definition of "prudent" can sometimes be a mystery. Most
states have adopted the Uniform Prudent Investor Act (UPIA), which
defines how a trustee should conduct himself: "[a] trustee shall invest and
manage trust assets as a prudent investor would, by considering the
purposes, terms, distribution requirements, and other circumstances of the
trust."8

5. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 2 (2001).
6. GEORGE G. BOGERT ET AL., BOGERT TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES § 706 (rev. 2d & 3d eds.,
2011) [hereinafter BOGERT]; see also UNIF. TRUST CODE § 804, 7C U.L.A. 601 (2000)
("[T]rustee shall administer the trust as a prudent person would . . . ."); RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 77 ("The trustee has a duty to administer the trust as a prudent person
would . . . .").
7. BOGERT, supra note 6, § 706; see also UNIF. PRUDENT INVESTOR ACT § 2, 7B U.L.A.

588-90 (1994).
8. UNIF. PRUDENT INVESTOR ACT
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A trustee also has a duty of loyalty to beneficiaries. He must "administer
the trust solely in the interest of the beneficiaries" 9 and "communicate to
the beneficiary all material facts the trustee knows or should know in
connection with the matter."o When a trustee fails to live up to these
required standards, that trustee is liable to the beneficiaries to the extent that
he failed to perform his obligations."
It is often unclear, however, what specific standards and obligations
apply to the trustee in managing the trust. In JicarillaIII, the obligation in
question was whether the government had a duty to disclose legal
communications between the government and its attorneys concerning trust
management. 12 According to the Restatement, a trustee has a duty to keep
beneficiaries

"reasonably

informed

.

.

.

about

other

significant

developments concerning the trust and its administration, particularly
material information needed by beneficiaries for the protection of their
The question, then, is whether this statement requires
interests."l 3
disclosure of the legal communications between a trustee and his attorney
when the subject of those communications is trust management. In a
comment to the Restatement, the authors note that communications between
a trustee and his attorney that relate to anticipated litigation or personal
protection are not subject to the duty to disclose.14 However, the comment
distinguishes communications that concern the trustee and his
administration of the trust, noting that they are subject to "the general
principle entitling a beneficiary to information that is reasonably necessary
to the prevention or redress of a breach of trust or otherwise to the
enforcement of the beneficiary's rights under the trust."15
B. Tribal Trusts: Administration,Jurisdictionand Duties
1. OrganizationandJurisdictionto Hear Claims by Tribes
Trust management of tribal trust funds falls within the purview of the
U.S. Department of Interior (DOI), specifically with the Secretary of the
9. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 78(1).
10. Id. § 78(3); see also UNIF. TRUST CODE § 802 ("Duty of Loyalty").
11. BOGERT, supra note 6, § 706.
12. JicarillaIII, 131 S. Ct. 2313, 2318 (2011).
13. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 82(1)(c); see also UNIF. TRUST CODE § 813
(requiring a trustee to "keep the qualified beneficiaries of the trust reasonably informed
about the administration of the trust and of the material facts necessary for them to protect
their interests").
14. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 82 cmt. f.
15. Id.
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Interior.16 The DOI manages tribal trust funds, which originate from
revenue generated from the sale of tribal property that is deposited into the
U.S. Treasury Department.17 Direct administration of the trust is delegated
to the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA).18 Suits against the DOI must be
brought in the Court of Federal Claims (CFC). The CFC has authority to
hear all tribal claims against the government, deriving its authority from
two main statutes: 28 U.S.C. § 1491 (the Tucker Act)' 9 and 28 U.S.C. §
1505 (the Indian Tucker Act).2 0 Together, these two statutes give the CFC
authority to hear claims by Native Americans against the United States
when those claims are founded on the "Constitution, laws, or treaties of the
United States." 21
Since the adoption of the Indian Tucker Act, there has been heated
debate about whether the statute is sufficient to allow compensation. In a
recent case, the Supreme Court reiterated that the Indian Tucker Act does
not create substantive rights, but merely "waive[s] sovereign immunity for
claims premised on other sources of law."22 The source of law that the
claimant relies on, i.e., a treaty, statute, or executive order, "triggers
liability only if it 'can fairly be interpreted as mandating compensation by
the Federal Government."' 2 3 A tribe's best bet is to find a more specific
statute, as opposed to one that defines broad duties. As the following
section explains, with a particular emphasis on those cases dealing with
tribal trusts, case law has evolved in terms of what is required of a statute
entitling a claimant to compensation.
supra note 1, at 403; see also Interior OrganizationalChart, U.S. DEP'T OF
http://www.doi.gov/whoweare/orgchart.cfn (last visited Mar. 5, 2012) (flow chart
of the organization of the Department of Interior).
17. COHEN, supra note 1, at 407 (citing REPORT ON THE AMERICAN INDIAN TRUST FUND
MANAGEMENT REFORM ACT OF 1994, H.R. REP. No. 103-778 (1994)) ("Trust fund accounts
are comprised mainly of money received through the sale or lease of trust lands and include
timber stumpage, oil and gas royalties, and agriculture feeds.").
18. Id. at 403-04.
19. 28 U.S.C. § 1491 (2006).
20. 28 U.S.C. § 1505 ("The United States Court of Federal Claims shall have
jurisdiction of any claim against the United States accruing after August 13, 1946, in favor
of any tribe, band, or other identifiable group of American Indians residing within the
territorial limits of the United States or Alaska whenever such claim is one arising under the
Constitution, laws or treaties of the United States, or Executive orders of the President, or is
one which otherwise would be cognizable in the Court of Federal Claims if the claimant
were not an Indian tribe, band or group.").
21. Id.; see also 28 U.S.C. § 1491.
22. United States v. Navajo Nation (Navajo II), 556 U.S. 287, 290 (2009).
23. Id. (quoting United States v. Testan, 424 U.S. 392, 400 (1976)).
16.

COHEN,

INTERIOR,
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2. Tribal Trust Duties
Two of the most important Supreme Court tribal trust cases are Mitchell
I24 and Mitchell J,25 which ultimately defined the characterization of the
trust relationship between the government and Native Americans. In
Mitchell I, the Quinalt Tribe sued the United States for the "alleged
mismanagement of timber resources found on [its] Reservation."2 6 The
Tribe's statutory authority was the General Allotment Act (GAA), which
allotted all of the Reservation's land in trust to individual Indians. The
Tribe's principal argument was that the government had "breached a
fiduciary duty owed to [it] by the United States as trustee of the allotted
lands under the [GAA]." 2 8 The issue before the Court was whether the
GAA provided a sufficient statutory basis for the Tribe's claim, and
whether the GAA established the kind of trust relationship between the
government and the Tribe that would obligate the United States to act with
full fiduciary duties.
The Court analyzed the history of the Act, finding that it "plainly
indicates" that Congress intended the trust created by it to be of "limited
scope."2 9 The legislative history reflected Congress's intention that title to
the allotted land "remain in the United States," but that Indian allottees
would be responsible for managing it. 30 The primary reason behind
keeping title with the United States, the Court reasoned, was that Congress
feared that if the Tribe had title to the land, it would be subject to state
taxes.3 1 Thus, the Court held the GAA created only a limited trust, which
imposed no timber management fiduciary obligations. 32
In Mitchell II, the Tribe returned for a second round with the Supreme
Court. Realizing from Mitchell I that it needed to cite a statute that set forth
specific trust obligations, the Tribe came equipped with better statutory
ammunition. The claim was the same as in Mitchell I: that the government
had breached a fiduciary duty. This time, however, the Tribe relied on 25
U.S.C. §§ 405-407, which gives the Secretary of Interior "broad statutory

24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.

United States v. Mitchell (Mitchelll), 445 U.S. 535 (1980).
United States v. Mitchell (Mitchell ll), 463 U.S. 206 (1983).
Mitchell 1, 445 U.S. at 537.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 543.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 545.
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The issue was once
authority over the sale of timber on reservations."
again whether the statutes entitled the Tribe to compensation based on a
theory of mismanagement of trust.
The Court considered the statutes and concluded that they detailed the
timber management responsibilities of the government. 34 The regulations
were not broad and general like the language of the GAA at issue in
Mitchell I, but instead precisely defined the specific responsibilities that the
government held in harvesting and selling timber for the benefit of Native
Americans.35 The Court held that the statutes "establish a fiduciary
relationship and define the contours of the United States' fiduciary
responsibilities,"36 and noted "[o]ur construction of these statutes and
regulations is reinforced by the undisputed existence of a general trust
relationship between the United States and the Indian people." 37 That the
government had assumed "elaborate control" over Indian property gave rise
The Court found "[a]ll of the necessary
to a fiduciary relationship.
elements of a common law trust [] present: a trustee (the United States), a
beneficiary (the Indian allottees), and a trust corpus (Indian timber, lands,
and funds)."
The Mitchell cases provide insight into what kind of trusts specific
statutes create.40 More specifically, they define what weight will be given to
the statutory authority relied on by the claimant in determining whether a
fiduciary duty exists. If the statutes in question are broad and incapable of
being tied to a specific duty, then they most likely only create a limited trust
33. Mitchell II, 463 U.S. 206, 209 (1983).
34. Id. at 222.
35. Id. (quoting White Mountain Apache v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136, 147 (1980)) ("The
[DOI] - through the [BIA] - 'exercises literally daily supervision over the harvesting and
management of tribal timber."').
36. Id. at 224.
37. Id. at 225.
38. Id.
39. Id. The significance of this language is that it seems to indicate that there is a
possibility that the common law can play a role in tribal trust cases when the statute the
plaintiff is basing his claim on is at issue. In JicarillaIII, the Court disclaims any use of the
common law when interpreting federal statutes, but this is a blatant example of the Court
doing just that - analogizing to the common law to imply a fiduciary duty.
40. See generally United States v. Navajo Nation (Navajo 1), 537 U.S. 488 (2003)
(holding that the Indian Mineral Leasing Act of 1938 was insufficient to create a fiduciary
obligation that would entitle the Tribe to compensation); United States v. White Mountain
Apache Tribe, 537 U.S. 465 (2003) (holding that a statute stating that the government holds
certain reservation buildings in trust creates a fiduciary duty upon government to maintain
that property, and that the Tribe was entitled to sue for damages for failing to maintain it).
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with no fiduciary duties. However, if the statutes are more specific,
defining the government's role as trustee in a more concrete way, a court
might interpret them as creating a full fiduciary relationship, both express
and implied, between a tribe and the government. 4 1
In Jicarilla,the Tribe sued under the Indian Trust Fund Management
Reform Act of 1994 (TFMRA), which is codified at 25 U.S.C. § 162a(d).42
The law was passed in an effort to recognize "preexisting trust
responsibilities" of the government and to "identify] some of the Interior
Secretary's duties to ensure 'proper discharge of the trust responsibilities of
the United States."4' Section 162a(d) lists some of the trust responsibilities
of the Secretary of the Interior, such as "providing adequate systems for
accounting" and supplying beneficiaries with account balance statements.44
Nowhere in the statute, though, is there a specific duty to disclose
communications between a trustee and his attorney when those
communications concern the management of the trust, nor any requirement
to disclose information that reasonably relates to the management of the
trust like the duty found in the Restatement (Third) of Trusts and the
UTC.45
The statute says that the Secretary's duties "shall include (but are not
limited to)" the responsibilities listed.46 Exactly what else could be
required remains to be seen. Preeminent scholar Felix Cohen says the listed
duties supplement the common law, 47 but the question remains open for
debate. The Supreme Court in Jicarillasaid the common law could not be
drawn upon to require other duties, such as a duty to disclose legal
communications between a trustee and his attorney, i.e., the fiduciary
exception to the attorney-client privilege. To examine how the Court
reached that conclusion, and why its conclusion was flawed, the
background on the attorney-client privilege and fiduciary exception to that
privilege must be discussed.

41. COHEN, supra note 1, at 430-31 ("[L]anguage authorizing an agency to manage
resources, when coupled with actual control over those resources, will be sufficient to create
a claim even though the word 'trust' is not mentioned in the applicable statute or regulation,
or even though the statutes at issue are not comprehensive.").
42. JicarillaIII, 131 S. Ct. 2313, 2329 (2011).
43. Cobell v. Norton, 240 F.3d 1081, 1090 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (emphasis omitted).
44. 25 U.S.C. § 162a(d) (2006).
45. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 78(1) (2001).
46. 25 U.S.C. § 162a(d).
47. COHEN, supra note 1, at 410; see also Cobell, 240 F.3d at 1090.
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C. Attorney-Client Privilege and FiduciaryException
The attorney-client privilege is entirely a product of the common law,
not codified in any statute. It is an evidentiary privilege, consisting of: "(1)
a communication (2) made between privileged parties (3) in confidence (4)
The
for the purposes of providing legal assistance for the client.'
rationale behind the privilege is that it encourages a client to fully disclose
all material facts to his attorney without the fear of a third party later having
access to sensitive information, thus allowing an attorney to give
knowledgeable, educated advice.49 It is one of "the oldest of the privileges
for confidential communications known to the common law."50 The
privilege may lose its bite, however, when "the party asserting the privilege
owes a fiduciary obligation to the party seeking disclosure of confidential
communications."" Thus, the privilege is not absolute.
The fiduciary exception to the attorney-client privilege was first
recognized in U.S. courts in Garnerv. Wolfingbarger52 in a class action suit
In Garner, shareholders brought suit against a
brought by shareholders.
corporation, alleging violations of certain Acts, and seeking to recover the
purchase price of the stock they held in the corporation.54 During
discovery, Plaintiffs sought disclosure of certain communications between
the corporation and its attorney concerning the legality of the issuance and
sale of corporation stock, which the corporation refused to disclose." On
appeal, the Fifth Circuit held that because the corporation acts for the
benefit of shareholders, and because there is a mutuality of interest, the
attorney-client privilege is not absolute, but that shareholders must show
good cause for why the corporation should not be allowed to claim the
privilege.5 6 Some of the factors that a court will take into consideration
when determining good cause are "whether the party seeking the
information asserts a colorable claim, whether the information sought is not

48. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF LAW GOVERNiNG LAW: ATrORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE § 68
(2000).
49. See id. cmt. c.
50. Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981).
51. Patricia C. Kussmann, Annotation, Construction and Application of Fiduciary
Exception to Attorney-Client Privilege,47 A.L.R. 6TH 255, § 1 (2009).
52. 430 F.2d 1093, 1103-04 (5th Cir. 1970).
53. JicarillaIII, 131 S. Ct. 2313, 2321 (2011) (citing Garner,430 F.2d at 1103-04 (5th
Cir. 1970)).
54. Garner,430 F.2d at 1095.
55. Id. at 1096.
56. Id. at 1103-04.
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available elsewhere, whether the information sought is related to past or
present actions, and whether the information sought may risk a revelation of
trade secrets or other confidential information."
In the modem context,
in order to invoke the
cause"
show
"good
a
party
to
some courts still require
fiduciary exception in shareholder suits, even though it has already been
established that a fiduciary relationship exists.58
Six years after Garner, in Riggs National Bank of Washington, D.C. v.
Zimmer,59 the Delaware Chancery Court applied the fiduciary exception to
a trust case. 6 0 The beneficiaries of a trust brought suit against the trustee in
order to "reimburse the estate for alleged breaches of the trust in regard to
certain tax matters."6 1 The trustee refused to disclose communications
between himself and his attorney pertaining to legal advice sought by the
trustee regarding tax matters that directly affected the trust.62 Adopting
common law principles, the court held the trustee had to produce
documents relating to advice he sought from his attorney concerning
management of the trust.63 The court elucidated two main reasons for
applying the fiduciary exception: (1) the beneficiaries of the trust were the
"real clients," not the trustee, as they were ultimately the persons who
would benefit from the legal advice;" and (2) "the trustees have substantive
fiduciary duties to the beneficiaries." 5 Thus, once the "real client" is
determined, and the existence of a fiduciary relationship is found, the
fiduciary exception can be invoked to require disclosure of the otherwise
privileged communications. The Second, Fifth, Sixth, Ninth, and D.C.
Circuits recognize "some form" of the fiduciary exception to attorney-client
privilege.66 Whether the exception should apply to tribal trusts was the
main issue raised by the court's decision in Jicarilla.

57. Lawrence E. Jaffe Pension Plan v. Household Int'l, Inc., 244 F.R.D. 412, 422 (N.D.
Ill. 2006) (quoting J.H. Chapman Grp., Ltd. v. Chapman, No. 95 C 7716, 1996 WL 238863
(N.D. Ill. May. 2, 1996)).
58. See Kussmann, supra note 51, § 68.
59. 355 A.2d 709 (Del. Ch. 1976).
60. See generally id.
61. Id. at 710.
62. Id.
63. See id.
64. Id. at 711.
65. Id. at 712.
66. In re United States (Jicarillall), 590 F.3d 1305, 1312 (Fed Cir. 2009), rev'd, 131 S.
Ct. 2313 (2011).
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II. United States v. Jicarilla Apache Nation
A. The Court of FederalClaims
The Jicarilla Apache Nation (the Tribe) brought suit in the CFC against
the United States for the alleged mismanagement of the Tribe's trust assets
and funds.67 The Tribe owns 900,000 acres in New Mexico that contain
timber, gravel, and oil and gas resources. 8 The proceeds from the
resources are held in trust by the United States. 69 The Tribe alleged that the
United States mismanaged the trust and sought an accounting of the assets
as well as $300 million in damages.70
After alternative dispute resolution failed, the case was returned to the
docket and the trial was bifurcated, with the first phase set to decide the
Tribe's fiscal claims.7 1 During the discovery process, a dispute arose when
the government invoked attorney-client privilege and refused to produce
155 non-trust related documents.72 The United States filed a motion for a
protective order, and the Tribe subsequently filed a motion to compel.73
The CFC reviewed the documents in camera, organizing them into five
categories:
(i) requests for legal advice from personnel in various Interior
agencies to Interior's Office of the Solicitor . .. either directly or
indirectly . . .; (ii) legal advice provided by the Solicitor's Office
or other government legal offices . . .; (iii) documents created by

or provided to the accounting firm of Arthur Anderson LLP
under a series of contracts between that firm and [the] Interior;
(iv) documents generated by Interior personnel, including
members of the Solicitor's Office, regarding pending or
anticipated litigation involving other tribes; and (v) other
miscellaneous documents or drafts . . . .

After discussing the organization of the documents, the CFC began its
analysis of the trust relationship between the United States and Native
Americans.
67. Jicarilla Apache Nation v. United States (Jicarilla1), 88 Fed. Cl. 1, 3 (2009).
68. Brief for Petitioner at 2, United States v. Jicarilla Apache Nation, 131 S. Ct. 2313
(2011) (No. 10-382), 2011 WL 661710, at *2.
69.

Id

70.
71.
72.
73.
74.

Id at 3.
JicarillaI, 88 Fed. Cl. at 3.
Id. at 4.
Id.
Id. at 6.
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Throughout history, the CFC reiterated, there has been a trust
While that
relationship between the United States and Indians.
relationship is typically codified in statutes that usually "serve to delimit ...
the government's obligations, it has . . . historically been measured and

evaluated using principles typically applied to the common law fiduciary
The CFC noted that a "'fiduciary exception' to the
relationships."7
attorney-client privilege is 'well established in [the] federal jurisprudence'
of many circuits."77 In fact, "seven circuits (the Second, Fourth, Fifth,
Sixth, Ninth, Eleventh, and D.C.) have adopted some version of the
fiduciary exception to the attorney client privilege." 78
The CFC also noted that the fiduciary exception has been applied in
tribal trust cases. 79 The courts that have applied the exception do so based
on the reasoning that there really is no privilege because the advice sought
by the trustee is for the beneficiary, so the privilege never existed in the
first place.80 A trustee cannot shield communications with his attorney
when they relate to management; only when the communications relate to
non-trust matters or personal interests may the privilege be claimed."
The United States argued that the fiduciary exception was not a concept
that could be applied in tribal trust cases, but the CFC dismissed the
argument, finding no reason why "basic trust principles" could not be
"transfer[red] to the Indian trust context." 82 According to Rule 501 of the
Federal Rules of Evidence, evidentiary privilege questions are to be decided
by the courts, through principles of the common law.83 Since the Federal
Rules of Evidence allow a court to decide questions of privilege through
application of the common law, it was within the court's discretion to find
the government had a common law fiduciary duty to disclose the
communications.

75.
76.
77.
2000)).
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.

Id. at 5-6.
Id. at 6.
Id. at 10 (quoting Geissal v. Moore Med. Corp., 192 F.R.D. 620, 624 (E.D. Mo.
Id. at 11.
Id.
Id. at 10.
Id.
Id. at 11-12.
FED. R. EVID. 501.
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While the United States argued its trust relationship with the Tribe was
distinct from a private trustee, the court was less than sympathetic. 84
Ultimately, the court concluded the fiduciary exception to the attorneyclient privilege could be applied to: documents in category (i) because they
8 most documents in category
related to the "administration of tribal trusts;""
(ii) because they "relate generally to trust administration;"8 some
documents in category (iii) that the court found were not prepared in
anticipation of litigation, and therefore not subject to the work product
rule;87 some documents in category (iv) that were not work-product;8 8 and
lastly, a few documents in category (v) because they were also not workproduct and related to trust management.89 The United States subsequently
filed for writ of mandamus to order the CFC to vacate its order directing the
government to produce the documents.90
B. The United States Court ofAppeals, FederalCircuit
The issue in the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit was limited to
whether the fiduciary exception to the attorney-client privilege could be
applied to tribal trust cases. The United States presented four main
arguments: (1) the fiduciary exception does not apply because the "United
States has competing interests to consider;" (2) the legal advice sought by
the United States was not paid for out of the trust corpus, so the attorneyclient privilege protects those communications; (3) if the exception were to
be applied, the United States would be unable to seek confidential legal
advice; and (4) the United States has no "fiduciary duty to disclose
information to beneficiaries." 9
First, the court looked at the early American cases that dealt with the
fiduciary exception, as well as some recent application of the exception in
the ERISA context.92 The court found not a single federal court of appeals
had rejected the fiduciary exception entirely,93 and while no federal court of
84. See Jicarilla1, 88 Fed. Cl. at 3-4. "The fiduciary relationship between the federal
government and Indian tribes took form long ago, arising first under treaties and then under
statutes." Id. at 5.
85. Id. at 14.
86. Id.
87. Id at 16-18.
88. Id. at 18.
89. Id at 19.
90. JicarillaII, 590 F.3d 1305, 1308 (Fed. Cir. 2009), rev'd, 131 S. Ct. 2313 (2011).
91. Id. at 1309.
92. Id. at 1310-13.
93. Id. at 1312.
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appeals had addressed the fiduciary exception in a tribal trust case, federal
trial courts had.94 The courts that had applied the fiduciary exception did so
for two reasons: (1) a "fiduciary is not the attorney's exclusive client, but
acts as a proxy for the beneficiary;" and (2) the "fiduciary has a duty to
disclose all information related to trust management to the beneficiary." 9 5
Drawing on the factors set forth in Riggs, the court identified the Tribe as
the "real client" of the attorney.96 Thus, when the Interior Department
sought advice from attorneys concerning management of the Tribe's trust,
the attorney's "real client" was the Tribe, not the Interior Department.
The court held the United States-tribal relationship was "sufficiently
similar to a private trust to justify applying the fiduciary exception."9 7 The
statutes, like 25 U.S.C. § 162a(d), that the trial court relied on, created a
fiduciary relationship. While certain statutes create specific duties, those
duties are not exhaustive. Principles of the common law "should generally
apply to the United States when it acts as trustee over tribal assets."99 The
common law principle on which the court primarily relied was the general
duty of a trustee to disclose to beneficiaries information that directly relates
to the administration of the trust. 00 The fiduciary exception, then,
manifests a trustee's general duty to disclose, which the court found
completely applicable in the tribal trust context.' 0
The government's
argument, that 25 U.S.C. § 162a(d) marks the boundary of what the
government as trustee must disclose, was flawed because the statute
specifically stated that the government's duties were not limited to the

duties listed.10 2
The last issue the court discussed was the government's argument, that
an application of the fiduciary exception is not feasible because of the
burden of identifying competing interests. The primary authority relied on
by the United States was Nevada v. United States.'0 o In Nevada, the
94. Id. at 1312-13.
95. Id. at 1312.
96. Id. at 1313.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 1314. The court brought the following statutes to attention: "25 U.S.C. §
162(a) [sic] (2006) (trust investment); § 450j (contract administration); § 458cc (funding
agreements); § 3120 (forest resources); § 3303 (education); § 3701 (agricultural resources);
§ 4021 (trust fund management); §§ 4041-43 (special trustee)." Id.
99. Id.
100. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTs § 2(a) (2001).
101. JicarillaI, 590 F.3d at 1317.
102. 25 U.S.C. § 162a(d) (2006); see also JicarillaII, 590 F.3d at 1313-14.
103. JicarillaII, 590 F.3d at 1314.
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Supreme Court held "the Government cannot follow the fastidious
standards of a private fiduciary, who would breach his duties to his single
beneficiary solely by representing potentially conflicting interests without
the beneficiary's consent." 104 Essentially, the argument is that the
government acts as trustee for many tribes, not just one, thus representing
many interests. The government, therefore, is often forced to balance those
competing interests. Thus, communications may concern more than one
tribe, which differs somewhat from the typical private trust context.
The government failed to explicitly identify a competing interest. 05 The
court dismissed the government's arguments, and pointed to the fact that
the documents at issue only related to trust accounts, not the management
of natural resources where conflicting statutes might arise, like in
Nevada.106
The appeals court held that a trust relationship existed between the Tribe
and the United States and found a general trust relationship was present
with full fiduciary duties flowing from that relationship.107 The United
States subsequently applied for certiorari to the Supreme Court of the
United States, which was granted. 08
C. The Supreme Court'sDecision
In an opinion written by Justice Alito, the Supreme Court categorically
rejected the holdings of the Court of Federal Claims and Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit. With the exception of a dissenting opinion by
Justice Sotomayor, the Court dismissed all the Tribe's arguments that the
United States' trust duties are governed by statute and common law
principles. Unlike the decisions below, the Court refused to analogize the
government's trust responsibilities to a private trustee,' 09 and firmly held
that "[t]he trust obligations of the United States to the Indian tribes are
established and governed by statute rather than the common law."'lo
The Court began by first emphasizing how the trust relationship between
the United States and the Tribe is not akin to a private trust."' In fact, only
25 U.S.C. § 162a(d) defines the disclosure responsibilities of the United

104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.

Nevada v. United States, 463 U.S. 110, 128 (1983).
JicarillaI, 590 F.3d at 1315.
Id
See id. at 1314-15.
Id. at 1315 (Fed. Cir. 2009), cert. granted, 131 S. Ct. 856 (2011).
JicarillaII, 131 S. Ct. 2313, 2318 (2011).
Id.
Id. at 2323.
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States,1 12 and although statutes that define the government's obligations to
the Tribe may indicate a trust exists, those statutes mark the end of the
government's duties.' 13 The Court reiterated the mere presence of the word
"trust" in a statute does not create full fiduciary obligations governed by the

common law.1 14
In analyzing Jicarilla's trust relationship with the United States, the
Court looked to the Mitchell cases and reaffirmed that Congress can create
limited or bare trusts if it wishes.115 Justice Alito compared 25 U.S.C. §
162a(d) to the General Allotment Act at issue in Mitchell I, finding that it
merely created a limited trust, devoid of congressional intent to obligate the
government to full fiduciary duties.'16
Title 25 U.S.C. § 162a(d) lists the trust duties of the Secretary of
The statute specifically states, "The Secretary's proper
Interior. 117
discharge of the trust responsibilities of the United States shall include (but
are not limited to) the following." 18 While the Tribe contended this part of
the statute created a hole through which common law principles,
specifically the fiduciary exception, could be inserted, the Court
disagreed.1 19 Instead, the Court found "[r]eading the statute to incorporate
the full duties of a private, common-law fiduciary would vitiate Congress'
specification of narrowly defined disclosure obligations." 20 Thus, the
Court closed the door on any type of argument as to what may or may not
be required in terms of trust obligations in relation to the "but are not
limited to" section of § 162a(d). 12 1
The Court went on to explain that the United States has a distinct interest
in the management of Indian tribes.122 The United States enforces statutes
relating to Indian trusts through its role as sovereign, but not as a common

112. 25 U.S.C. § 162a(d) (2006);JicarillaIll, 131 S. Ct. at 2329-30.
113. See JicarillaIII, 131 S. Ct. at 2323.
114. Id.
115. Id. (citing Mitchell II, 463 U.S. 206, 224 (1983); Mitchell I, 445 U.S. 535, 542
(1980)).
116. See id. at 2325; Mitchell 1, 445 U.S. at 544. The Court says it will only "apply
common-law principles where Congress had indicated it is appropriate to do so." Jicarilla
III, 131 S. Ct. at 2325.
117. 25 U.S.C. § 162a(d).
118. Id. (emphasis added).
119. See Jicarilla II, 131 S. Ct. at 2330.
120. Id.
121. 25 U.S.C. § 162a(d).
122. JicarillaIII, 131 S. Ct. at 2324.
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law trustee.12 3 The "organization and management of the trust is a
sovereign function subject to the plenary authority of Congress." The Court
stated a tribe "must point to a right conferred by statute or regulation in
order to obtain otherwise privileged information from the government
against its wishes."l 24 Stated otherwise, the Court declined to force the
government to disclose the documents unless the tribe could identify a
statute that specifically says it must.
To bolster its argument that the government acts in a sovereign
capacity, the Court pointed to the fact that congressional funds paid for the
legal advice. Thus, the government is the "real client," not the tribe,
according to Justice Alito.125 The Court contended that the government's
management of tribal trusts is, in part, a "'moral obligation,"'l26 meaning
there is an absence of the typical characteristics of a private trust, like a
fiduciary duty. Unlike a private trustee, the government obtains legal advice
not simply for the benefit of the tribe, but rather to fulfill "its sovereign
interests in the execution of federal law."l 2 7 In essence, the Court is saying
that in a typical private trust, the trustee's only role is in facilitating the
interests of the beneficiary.12 8 The government's job, however, as
sovereign, is to execute federal law, and by executing federal law, the
government manages tribal trusts. Consequently, the government does not
seek legal advice to benefit the tribe, but rather to facilitate its sovereign
duty to execute the law. If one accepts this reasoning, then the attorneyclient privilege lies with the government and its attorneys, not with the
attorneys and the tribe.
The Court concluded that if the fiduciary exception were allowed,
identifying conflict of interests in each communication for purposes of
whether to apply attorney-client privilege would be much too burdensome,
and "[the government's] ability to receive confidential legal advice would
be substantially compromised." 2 9

123. Id. "The Government assumes Indian trust responsibilities only to the extent it
expressly accepts those responsibilities by statute." Id. at 2325.
124. Id. at 2325.
125. Id. at 2326.
126. Id. (quoting Seminole Nation v. United States, 316 U.S. 286, 296-97 (1942)).
127. Id. at 2327-28.
128. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 78 (2001) ("[A] TRUSTEE HAS A DUTY TO
ADMINISTER THE TRUST SOLELY IN THE INTEREST OF THE BENEFICIARIES .....

129. JicarillaIII, 131 S. Ct. at 2328.
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III. Analysis
A. The United States andNative Americans Have a Trust Relationship
In its decision, the Supreme Court accepts that a general trust
n
relationship exists between the government and Native Americans.!is
only
exists
the same breath, however, the Court holds that the relationship
when it is convenient. In finding that Jicarillacould not apply the fiduciary
exception, the Court essentially held that the U.S.-tribal trust relationship
does not require strict fiduciary standards. This, of course, is not consistent
with a typical trust relationship.
As Justice Sotomayor notes in her dissent, "[s]ince 1831, this Court has
recognized the existence of a general trust relationship between the United
Statutes like 25 U.S.C. § 162a(d) and the
States and Indian tribes."'
timber management statutes at issue in Mitchell II reaffirm that the United
States is a statutorily obligated trustee of Indian land and resources, not
merely a trustee in name only.132 "Nearly every piece of modern legislation
dealing with Indian tribes contains a statement reaffirming the trust
relationship between tribes and the federal government."l 3 3 Given the
magnitude of resources the United States holds in trust for Indians, and
given that Native Americans rely on the government to prudently manage
those resources, it is difficult to accept that the government is in such a
''special" position to pick and choose when a true trust relationship exists.
The attorney-client privilege is a product of the common law, not
codified in statute, but the Court says the government can invoke it.
However, Jicarilla cannot claim the fiduciary exception because there is not
a statute on point saying it can. If the government can use the common law,
tribes should be permitted to as well.
B. The United States Has Not Only Statutory but Common Law Fiduciary
Obligationsto Native Americans
In the majority opinion of Jicarilla,the Court held that common law
principles could not be invoked to require a fiduciary duty to disclose the

130. Id. at 2323.
131. Id. at 2334 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting); see Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5
Pet.) 1 (1831).
132. See Mitchell II, 463 U.S. 206, 225 (1983) (finding construction of the timber
management statutes "reinforced by the undisputed existence of a general trust relationship
between the United States and Indian people").
133. COHEN, supra note 1, at 420-21.
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communications at issue.134 However, the majority fails to recognize prior
decisions that looked to the common law. 135 For example, in Mitchell II, the
Supreme Court held that certain timber management statutes created a
fiduciary relationship between the United States and the Tribe.' 36 Finding
that a fiduciary relationship arises when "the Government assumes . . .
elaborate control over" Indian property, the Court found all of the
"elements of a common-law trust [were] present: a trustee (the United
States), a beneficiary (the Indian allottees), and a trust corpus (Indian
timber, lands, and funds)."l 37 Thus, the Court found it was well within its
power to find that the government was subject to the obligations that attach
to a trustee acting in a fiduciary capacity.
The facts in this case are similar. There is a trustee (the United States), a
beneficiary (the Jicarilla Tribe), and a trust corpus (assets from 900,000
acres of land). The majority opinion, however, likens the facts of this case
to Mitchell I, finding that 25 U.S.C. § 162a(d) is similar to the GAA at issue
in Mitchell I, in that the statute is devoid of congressional intent to obligate
the government to full fiduciary duties.1 38 The Court's reasoning is flawed.
If a statute, like the one at issue in Mitchell II and in this case, is specific
and defines the government's role as a trustee, a court is free to interpret the
statute as creating a full fiduciary relationship.13 9 This is especially true
when there is a statute like 25 U.S.C. § 162a(d) that contains language by
which common law principles can be inferred. Mitchell II has never been
overruled, and should have been the controlling law in this case.
Similar to Mitchell II, in White Mountain Apache, the Court found that
since the government held in trust certain Reservation property,
"elementary trust law . . . confirms the commonsense assumption that a
fiduciary actually administering the trust property may not allow it to fall
Just like the fiduciary duty that attaches to a private
into ruin . . . .
trustee who controls how the trust corpus is managed, the same fiduciary
duty attaches to the government when it assumes similar control over tribal
assets, even if that duty is a product of the common law.
In Jicarilla, 25 U.S.C. § 162a(d) points to a fiduciary relationship
between the United States and the Tribe. The title of § 162a(d), "Trust
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.

Jicarilla II, 131 S. Ct. at 2323-28.
Id. at 2331-32 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
Mitchell II, 463 U.S. at 228.
Id. at 225.
JicarillaIII, 131 S. Ct. at 2325.
Mitchell H, 463 U.S. at 225.
United States v. White Mountain Apache Tribe, 537 U.S. 465, 475 (2003).
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responsibilities of Secretary of Interior," indicates on its face that the
government is tasked with certain control over the management of the trust.
And "while the presence of the word 'trust"' is not always determinative in
the analysis, it "will be given great weight." 4 When the United States
assumes a role as trustee of Native American funds, it also assumes
common law fiduciary obligations.
There is no statute that says the United States must disclose attorneyclient communications regarding the management of a tribe's trust. But if
one accepts that there is a true fiduciary relationship between the United
States and the tribe, there would be no need for one, and moreover, there
would be no reason why general trust principles could not be applied to fill
in the gap left by 25 U.S.C. § 162a(d) to infer other duties of disclosure.
"The general 'contours' of the government's [fiduciary] obligations may be
defined by statute, but the interstices must be filled in through reference to
general trust law."' 4 2
In addition, there is no evidentiary reason why the common law fiduciary
exception to the attorney-client privilege could not be applied. Federal
Rule of Evidence 501 states explicitly that the rules governing evidentiary
privileges "shall be governed by the principles of the common law as they
may be interpreted by the courts of the United States in the light of reason
and experience." 4 3
As mentioned earlier, there is a certain amount of injustice in allowing
the United States to claim a common law privilege absent statutory
authority, yet flatly denying tribes the right to claim the fiduciary exception
to that privilege simply because there is no statute that explicitly says they
can. As Jicarillanoted in its brief, pointing to United States v. Mett, "the
government itself has invoked the exception in litigation involving private
fiduciaries."'" In a recent case, for example, the Fourth Circuit held that the
Secretary of Labor could invoke the fiduciary exception to overcome a
claim of attorney-client privilege by employee benefit plans accused of
mismanaging ERISA funds. 145
To say the government may invoke the exception, albeit only in certain
circumstances, but the tribe cannot, is patently unfair. A trust, at its very
141. COHEN, supra note 1, at 429-30.
142. Cobell v. Norton, 240 F.3d 1081, 1101 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
143. FED.R.EvID. 501.
144. Brief for Respondent at 7, United States v. Jicarilla Apache Nation, 131 S. Ct. 2313
(2011) (No. 10-382), 2011 WL 1089622, at *7 (citing United States v. Mett, 178 F.3d 1058,
1061, 1064 n.9 (9th Cir. 1999)).
145. See Solis v. Food Emp'rs Labor Relations Ass'n, 644 F.3d 221, 224 (4th Cir. 2011).
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core, is a relationship between the trustee and the beneficiaries. It is a twoway street, with information, obligations, and power flowing both ways
between the beneficiary and the trustee. If the government can invoke the
attorney-client privilege absent a statutory basis, but Jicarilla cannot invoke
the fiduciary exception to the privilege because there is no statute that says
it can, then the trust relationship starts to resemble a one-way street. A trust
that has power flowing only one way, with one side making all the
decisions, begins to take the form of a dry or passive trust - in other
words, no trust at all.
On its face, this opinion may appear to apply only to a simple issue of
evidentiary privilege. Considered more closely, this case illustrates how the
Supreme Court has once again chipped away at the U.S.-tribal trust
relationship. The implication of the Court's holding is that the government,
as trustee, has no real duties and little accountability when viewed through
the language of 25 U.S.C. § 162a(d). To hold that the government's
fiduciary duties are limited by statute is to effectively render tribes
powerless in obtaining redress for trust mismanagement. It also effectively
renders the language of § 162a(d) useless because it says that the
government's duties "are not limited to" those listed. Once again, the
Court's holding reinforces that the trust relationship is a one-way street.
This, however, is not acceptable if a true tribal trust relationship is to exist.
There must be some middle ground.
Three general principles are embedded in trust law: (1) the trustee owes
the beneficiary a duty of loyalty; (2) the trustee must act as a prudent
investor; and (3) the trustee must provide the beneficiary with a certain
degree of access to trust management information.14 6 These three principles
are universal, regardless of whether they are being applied in the private
trust context or the tribal trust context. It would be difficult to imagine a
trustee, in any context, who would not at least be subject to these three
obligations. In the U.S.-tribal trust context, these three doctrines are not
codified in statute, but it would be contrary to general trust law to say that
they are not implied.
When the government assumes responsibility for the management of
tribal assets, it also assumes an obligation to act as a loyal, prudent investor.
As trustee, the government additionally assumes a general, fiduciary
obligation to provide beneficiaries of the trust corpus with a certain degree
of access to information that pertains to the management of the tribal trust.
While these obligations are statutorily absent, they must not be disregarded.
146. See supranotes 7-15 and accompanying text.
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The language of 25 U.S.C. § 162a(d) specifically "recognize[s] that the
Government has pre-existing trust responsibilities that arise out of the
broader statutory scheme governing the management of Indian trust
funds."l 47 Congress placed the "but are not limited to" language into the
statute in order to recognize that certain trust principles, while not expressly
listed, are inherent in the U.S.-tribal trust relationship.148 Any other reading
of the statutory language would be invalid. The statute clearly gives courts
the ability to infer certain trust obligations, and to do so, if needed, on a
case-by-case basis. In relation to the third principle mentioned above, the
statute allows a court to "flesh out the Government's disclosure obligations
under the broader statutory regime, consistent with its role as a
conventional fiduciary .

...

Through its holding, the Supreme Court refused to interpret the language
of § 162a(d), and effectively disregarded it entirely. The majority opinion
recognizes that § 162a(d) "delineates 'trust responsibilities of the United
States,"' but reiterates that the common law does not override the
government's disclosure obligations. 50 However, the Court also says
"common-law principles are relevant only when applied to a 'specific,
applicable, trust-creating statute or regulation."'" 5 '
The Court's reasoning that common law principles could not be applied
to the trust-creating statute is flawed. First, § 162a(d) is certainly a trustcreating statute because it specifically defines the duties of the government
in managing tribal trust assets. Second, since the statute.is trust creating,
the Court is free to apply common law principles. As the Court stated,
common law principles can be applied to a statute that creates a trust and
defines the responsibilities of the government in managing that trust.152
Instead, the Court dismisses its own initial analysis and concludes, "the
common law of trusts does not override the specific trust-creating statute
and regulations that apply here."' 53
This is all-or-nothing approach is simply unnecessary. An application of
common law trust principles would not override the specific disclosure
obligations set forth in the statute. It would merely supplement the statute.
Title 25 U.S.C. § 162a(d) is a way by which a court can infer additional
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.

JicarillaIII, 131 S. Ct. 2313, 2341 (2011) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
25 U.S.C. § 162a(d) (2006).
JicarillalH1, 131 S. Ct. at 2341 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
Id. at 2329-30 (majority opinion).
Id. at 2329 (quoting United States v. Navajo Nation, 556 U.S. 287, 302 (2009)).
Id. at 2329-30.
Id. (emphasis added).
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obligations of the government, not override what is already stated in the
statute. The Court could have easily adopted a theory of analysis that
would allow courts in the future to make a case-by-case determination, with
the aid of general trust principles. In the interest of fairness, tribes should
not have a trust relationship initially forced upon them, only later to have it
disavowed when convenient for the government.
C. A Workable, Narrow Application of the FiduciaryException to AttorneyClient Privilege Can Coexist with U.S. Interests andIts Positionas
Sovereign
In the CFC proceeding, the United States did not assert any specific
conflict of interest, yet the Supreme Court held that conflicts of interest
were but another reason why the fiduciary exception should not be applied.
In the Court's view, an identification of all the competing interests would
be "much too burdensome." In reality, however, an identification of
conflicting interests would not be more difficult than issues of privilege that
the Court must already consider. Like the CFC did when it reviewed the
documents in camera, courts in the future could do the same. As Justice
Sotomayor points out in her dissent, typical "privilege determinations" are
already made on a case-by-case basis.15 4 Thus, courts would not really be
taking an additional step in the privilege determination process. If a
conflict of interest exists, the government would have to argue it just as
they would any other privilege issue. The Court, then, would take its
argument into consideration, eventually making a privilege determination.
But flatly denying a tribe the right to see how their trust was being
managed based on the assertion that there might be a conflict of interest
makes it far too easy to evade accountability. After all, "the existence of
competing interests is not unique to the Government as trustee."' 55 Private
trustees, with obligations to multiple beneficiaries, are often confronted
with competing interests, yet cannot deny a beneficiary information simply
because it might create a conflict of interest issue. Thus, characterizing the
United States as unique in light of its obligations to many tribes is not a
valid argument that would justify withholding information. Just like private
trustees, the government must balance competing interests, and a court must
make a case-by-case determination of each interest, not apply an all-ornothing rule that denies a tribe access to information.

154. Id. at 2338 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
155. Id. at 2337-38.
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The Supreme Court went to great lengths to distinguish the government's
role from that of a private trustee. As a sovereign entity, Justice Alito
explained, the United States is carrying out its own distinct interests. 56
While this is true, it in no way diminishes the relationship between the
United States and Native Americans. Like the government, Native
Americans also have a distinct interest in ensuring that their assets are
properly managed. In theory, one would think a distinct interest of a
sovereign, such as the United States, would be to promote fair and
democratic justice to a historically mistreated people.
In discussing the government's relationship with Native Americans, the
Court in Seminole Nation v. United States recognized that there is a
"distinctive obligation of trust incumbent upon the Government in its
dealings with these dependent and sometimes exploited people."157 That
"distinctive obligation" should actually elevate the United States to a higher
duty than a private trustee, or at least put it in a comparable position. "The
standard of duty as trustee for Indians is not mere reasonableness, but the
highest of fiduciary standards."'
The government, then, if it wishes to
retain a trust relationship with Native Americans, in a legal and
metaphorical sense, must adhere to fiduciary standards in the future.
IV Conclusion
The effect of the Jicarillacase is not merely that the fiduciary exception
to attorney-client privilege does not apply in the tribal trust context; it also
represents a general trend toward the degradation of the U.S.-tribal trust
relationship as a whole. The United States has assumed the role of trustee
of tribal assets, and it should thus be subject to the fiduciary obligations that
result when such power is exercised. There is no doubt that a trust
relationship exists between the United States and Native Americans. The
government must accept that general trust principles, not codified in statute,
but embedded in general trust doctrine and the common law, govern how it
acts in managing Indian funds.
To deny a tribe access to information is to deny a tribe of its legal right
to hold the government, as trustee, to the fiduciary standards that all trustees
must uphold. The government's duties should not be limited by statute, but
rather supplemented, in the interest of fairness, by general trust doctrine. If
156. Id. at 2324 (majority opinion).
157. 316 U.S. 286, 296 (1942).
158. American Indians Residing on the Maricopa-Ak Chin Reservation v. United States,
667 F.2d 980, 990 (Ct. C1. 1981).
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the United States continues to limit its own trust duties for the sake of
convenience and legal advantage, the tribal trust stands in grave danger of
becoming no trust at all.
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